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Introduction 
The development and effective utilization of human capital serves as an increasingly vital source of value and competitive advantage for 
individual firms as well as for the economies in which they operate. While access to fertile land, raw materials, financial capital, and physical 
technologies may have been the dominant sources of competitive advantage in agrarian and industrial-era economies, knowledge, learning, 
and a set of reinforcing employment practices are the critical requirements to transform the term ‘knowledge economy’ from rhetoric to 
reality. In fact, research has demonstrated rather clearly that even all those observed performance and welfare gains that at first appear to 
be driven by state-of-the-art computers and information technology (IT) can just as well be ascribed to the human and organizational capital 
that makes those technologies so effective (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003, Brynjolfsson et al., 2002). 
The preceding chapters in this volume do a thorough job of showing how theories of human capital moved from their early-stage emphasis 
on individual, supply- side decisions regarding investments in education and training, to debates over when and why firms might share some 
of the costs of investing in workforce development, to more recent views on the relationship between human capital, social capital, firm 
strategies, and organizational design. We build on these points about the changing roles of individuals and firms, but add another: the 
importance of considering how employment relationships are changing and how labor-market institutions that have historically played key 
roles in addressing human capital- related challenges are now, too, eroding. As such, we pose a paradox. Just as human capital is growing in 
importance to individuals, firms, and national economies, many of the changes taking place in employment relationships and labor-market 
institutions are actually weakening both the incentives and the pressures on individual firms to invest. Resolving this paradox will require 
broadening the firm- centered approaches that dominate current analysis of human capital to give greater weight to extra-firm relationships, 
labor-market institutions, and the role of the state in overcoming market failures and encouraging business strategies that emphasize human 
capital as a source of competitive advantage. In line with this argument, this chapter draws on the employment relationship—not firms nor 
workers—as its unit of analysis. 
It is not surprising that most theories of human capital treat the firm as the key unit of analysis, given the deep imprint that Becker (1964 
[1993]) left with his early efforts to distinguish between general and specific human capital. It is especially understandable for research that 
focuses on American institutions and practices. Ever since the passage of the New Deal employment policies of the 1930s, firms have been 
assigned central roles in the delivery and financing of a variety of labor-market services,1 including the provision of workforce training and 
development (Osterman et al, 2001). Most of the chapters in this volume reflect this emphasis by exploring how individuals and firms allocate 
the costs and share the benefits of human capital, incorporating human capital development into alternative theories of the firm (such as 
transaction cost, resource-based, agency, entrepreneurial, and knowledge-based perspectives), and how human capital plays into emerging 
research on social capital, organizational capabilities, learning, and human resource strategies and architectures. But, as Chapters 12, 22, and 
23 each suggest, firm-centric theories, particularly those founded upon the neoclassical economics framework, need to more fully take into 
account how firm boundaries, strategies, and practices relate to other institutions in society. This is particularly important given the changes 
in employment relationships that are acting to reduce the labor-market functions served by individual employers. In short, the central 
argument of this chapter is that a more up-to-date theory of the changing nature of employment relationships is needed to understand 
whether and how human capital is to serve as a source of competitive advantage in a modern economy—even one as decentralized as that 
of the US. 
In the sections that follow we introduce a basic theoretical framework used to guide employment relations theory and research, and 
outline several assumptions about the nature of that system that have implicitly guided development and use of human capital within that 
system during the height of the industrial era—essentially the four decades after enactment of the New Deal legislation of the 1930s. Then, 
we note how changes in this system pose difficulties for the traditional actors and institutions to continue to perform their functions of 
developing and making full use of human capital today. Finally, we suggest a set of changes in organizational practices, labor-market 
institutions, and public policies that will be needed in order to realize a human capital or knowledge-driven economy. We undertake all of 
this by relying on three particular human capital-related issues that challenge our existing understanding of the way that employment 
relationships function: human capital investment and development, work-life integration, and technologically engendered changes in work. 
Basic Features of an Employment Relations System 
Much of researchers’ understanding of the employment relationship has been shaped by Dunlop’s concept of an ‘industrial relations system’ 
(Dunlop 1958 [1993]). According to Dunlop, workers and their representatives bargain implicitly or explicitly with their employers to 
determine a wide set of observable outcomes encompassing everything from wages to work structures to workplace norms. These 
interactions, and the resulting ‘web of rules’, were influenced by three aspects of the bargaining context: the technological characteristics of 
the work itself and of the wider society, the economic factors impacting upon labor, product, and factor markets, and the locus and 
distribution of power in society. As an illustration, imagine a major technological breakthrough allowing for easy substitution of capital for 
labor. Workers would find it difficult to maintain their wages and employment, unless, perhaps, one of the components of the new capital 
were to witness an inordinate price increase. Therefore, the system would have to process these two opposing forces—potential efficiencies 
arising from technological change and the potential costs attendant to capital substitution—as it recalibrated to a revised set of outcomes. 
Extensions to Dunlop’s original framework make it useful for explaining a wide range of strategic decisions (for example, Budd, 2004; Kochan 
et al, 1984)—such as the choice to produce in-house or to outsource, or the choice to use technology in a way that is ‘upskilling’ or in a way 
that is deskilling (Hunter et al, 2001). Among the attractive features of this framework is its respect for market forces and the forces of 
technological change, but insistence that these forces alone cannot and should not determine outcomes. 
Perhaps most remarkable about the original framework is its perceived stability. The roles of employee and employer were clearly 
defined—unlike in todays economy that acknowledges the ubiquity of self-employment, contracting, and contingent work, among other 
unconventional arrangements. In Dunlop’s world, th6 parties assumed one another a permanent fixture of the relationship—a sometimes 
disagreeable partner with whom they would have to engage in order to weather cyclical or structural changes in the world around them. 
Intensified competition for the company’s product, for example, impacted both parties. Changes in production standards meant that factories 
and workers might need to be retooled or retrained. But, through it all, the employment relationship would weather the storm, internalize 
the costs and the benefits of resulting adjustments, and partition them across workers and firms. We argue that this industrial relations 
system, which today we might call an ‘employment relations system’ or a set of work arrangements, can no longer be assumed an effective 
processor of the environmental changes affecting the development and use of human capital, even as we transition into an economic era in 
which it serves as the chief driver of value and competitive advantage. We turn next to identifying the set of assumptions that underpin our 
existing notions of the employment relationship—assumptions that must be changed if we are to effectively leverage human capital. 
 
 
Inherited Assumptions Underpinning the Employment Relationship 
Whether or not we realize it, researchers and policy-makers bring a set of assumptions to bear on their study of the employment relationship. 
By and large, these assumptions go unstated and unnoticed until systems that once behaved reasonably well in light of the assumptions—
maybe an outlier here or an anomaly there— start to produce as many unexplainable outcomes as they do explainable ones. Our central 
argument is that the very future of human capital hinges on a large-scale recasting of several key assumptions regarding the employment 
relationship, away from those developed in the context of an industrial economy to a new set that promotes competition on the basis of 
workers’ productive skills and accumulated knowledge. 
The first assumption regarded the geographic scope of competition. Industrial- era theories of employment relations, Dunlop (1958 
[1993]) included, assumed that national economies were self-contained. Therefore, it was reasonable for states to set and enforce minimal 
standards for wages and working conditions and for unions and other labor-market institutions to effectively ‘take wages out of competition’ 
(Commons, 1909). Firms may not have welcomed these regulatory floors or the pressures associated with unions and collective bargaining, 
for example, but these policies and institutions did help to level the competitive playing field within both product and labor markets. Second, 
clear boundaries were drawn between the economy on the one hand, and households on the other. Their only intersection in the labor 
market was the dominant male wage-earner, or ‘breadwinner’. His wages and benefits were the family’s primary support, complemented by 
the contributions of wives and mothers to non-economic, ‘home production’—a role to which they were assumed to be just as committed 
as men were to their paid work. Third, the job held by the male head of household was assumed to be full-time, long-term, stable, and usually 
with a very large industrial employer. The fourth assumption dealt with these employers, assuming them to be corporations housing clear, 
well-understood hierarchies of ‘managers’ and ‘workers’ within, and well-defined boundaries between themselves and the external product, 
labor, and capital markets in which they participated. One consequence of this was that anybody who ‘worked for’ the firm was an employee, 
and not a contingent worker, a contractor, nor any other classification that today we might refer to as ‘non-traditional’. Finally, out of the 
New Deal regulations and institutional arrangements emerged an implicit social contract in which long tenure and good performance in an 
organization were rewarded with wages and employment security that generally grew in tandem with profits and productivity. This social 
contract served as the glue holding the entire system together. 
As noted above, the constellation of institutions that make up incumbent employment systems once effectively internalized many of the 
costs and benefits of a functioning labor market, including those associated with three areas that are critical to the development and effective 
use of human capital—phenomena that we will use to illustrate how the system is changing. These tasks are (1) human capital investment 
and development, (2) utilization of human resource investments in the labor market, with particular emphasis on the changing role of women 
and work-life practices and policies, and (3) organizational strategies and practices that serve as complements needed to generate the full 
benefits from human capital—in particular, the role of technology and technological change. Examination of these phenomena reveals the 
gaps in our present approach to the employment relationship. 
Human Capital Investment and Development 
Investments in education and training are obviously critical to economies founded upon human capital—a point driven home by the previous 
chapters in this volume. However, as Blair notes in her chapter, the earliest pronouncements of what came to be regarded as human capital 
theory—most notably, Becker (1964 [1993])—theorized that much of the human capital required of workers would be systematically 
underprovided by the normal functioning of a competitive labor market. At the time, however, casual observation, not to mention data, 
repudiated the theory (for example, Berg, 1970 [2003]). Many employers offered what could only be categorized as general training—
confident that their employees, the objects of their investment, would remain with them long enough to deliver anticipated economic 
benefits. In this way, employment arrangements even managed the provision of continuing education and the training of adult workers. Thus, 
as the chapters in Part II of this volume emphasize, a deeper and more nuanced theory of the relationship of human capital and firm behavior 
was needed to explain this seemingly irrational behavior on the part of employers. 
The problem that Becker’s theory addressed was that of ‘poaching’—a phenomenon forestalled by the once-prevailing stability of 
employment relationships. But what happens when employment relationships cannot be assumed so stable? To the extent that a single firm 
invests in training and development, or what is now being called ‘life-long learning’, and to the extent that some or all of the skills developed 
are general enough to have value on the external labor market, competitors can ‘poach’ these workers, leaving the investing employer to 
bear the costs while the recruiting employer gains the benefits of the newly formed human capital—just as Becker theorized. The way that 
firms mitigated this market dilemma in the industrial era was through the social contract described above. Firms implicitly promised long-
term employment opportunities within their organizations in which employees would gain greater status, job security, income, and 
retirement benefits, and thus have incentives to stay with the firm. These promises were partly based on trust and norms, but were also 
reinforced by practices that Doeringer and Piore (1971) labeled ‘internal labor markets’ (ILMs). 
ILMs were a common way of structuring work in the industrial era. In their purest form, the firm initially appoints workers at the bottom 
rung of a tall, rigidly defined job ladder, ascending in title, wages, and responsibilities according to an accepted set of rules, norms, and 
customs within the firm. Each function or department has its own ladder, and workers are not expected to cross functions—let alone jump 
off of one firm’s ladder and onto another’s. In fact, with this model, job tasks are clearly delineated and arranged in such a way that each job 
prepares the incumbent for the next, higher job he or she will be holding. Were a worker enticed by another employer, he or she would be 
reluctant to give up their accrued benefits and seniority, so they became loyal, long-term employees. In the event of an economic slowdown, 
employers would not want to lay off the human capital in which they had invested, lest they create empty rungs in well-functioning job 
ladders. This made for loyal, long-term employers. Therefore, as long as ILM structures were stable, a great many employers provided workers 
with the sort of general training that should have made their workers ripe for poaching. Under the stylized version of the employment 
relationship described above, an expectation of long-term employment among both employers and employees engendered a level of 
certainty regarding which parties would benefit from workers’ increased productivity—the employer providing the training and the worker 
in whose mind the newly created human capital would reside. Just how the incremental surplus would be split between labor and capital was 
probably not completely settled ex ante, but workers, often with the help of their unions’ role in collective bargaining, could anticipate their 
accruing some share of these productivity gains in the form of real wage increases. What is more, these investments on the part of firms 
actually reinforced the strength of existing employment relationships, as employers were more likely to hold onto excess labor through 
cyclical slowdowns. As noted above, laying off a worker, aside from its violation of norms, meant forgoing any and all future returns to the 
firm’s investment.2 
Workers also absorbed human capital in informal ways as they moved through their respective ILMs. Promotions arose, in part, from 
one’s willingness to accept and pass on largely firm-specific skills. Furthermore, more-senior workers felt protected from competition from 
below, and were thus willing to train those employees on lower rungs of the job ladder. What resulted was an efficient system for training 
and retraining workers (Osterman and Burton, 2005)—a system that did not even need to appear explicitly on the firm’s books. 
Firms, however, did not necessarily invest in human capital purely of their own volition—a point often underemphasized in standard 
economic models of the firm as well as in the more recent transaction-cost, resource-based, and agency models discussed in this volume. 
Organized labor, for its own part and sometimes in conjunction with firms, played an active role in maintaining and growing the economy’s 
human capital stock. Industrial unions leveraged their bargaining power to demand that workers’ training be kept up to date. Some of this 
training, as we will discuss, was specifically intended to protect against employee displacement resulting from capital substitution. However, 
in the presence of job security provisions, employer-funded ‘upskilling’ also served the firm’s interests. Along a parallel but separate track, 
craft unions such as those encompassing plumbers, electricians, and other building trades developed and funded apprenticeship programs, 
often in partnership with industry-wide employer organizations as well as the state. In sum, the institutions that scaffolded the employment 
relationship bolstered human capital formation in ways unimaginable under standard neoclassical assumptions of a ‘spot market’ for labor. 
Work-Life Integration 
Perhaps less obvious, but equally important to the healthy functioning of a human capital-intensive economy, are the ways it manages the 
integration of labor’s working and non-working lives.3 The term ‘work-life integration’ most often refers to the costs exacted upon workers 
and their families from the intensification of the demands placed on them by their employers. Surprisingly, however, there is little discussion 
in the human capital literature of the fact that many economies have allowed a significant portion of their human capital investment to be 
underutilized because of assumptions and practices concerning the appropriate division of labor between men and women. This becomes an 
even bigger problem now than in the past as a clear majority of university degrees in the US are awarded to women, bringing the stock of 
this one particular form of human capital to within sight of gender equality (US Bureau of the Census, 2008). 
We have already seen the benefits of long-term employment for human capital formation. Another upshot of long-term employment was 
a perception among employers that corporate investments in workers’ non-work lives would bring returns to the firm. This view was most 
notably illustrated in 1913, by Henry Ford’s introduction of the five-dollar day—part of a larger benefits package that included what we think 
of today as profit-sharing. The argument was that by the payment of a higher wage, not only would turnover be reduced, but male employees 
would earn enough to care for their families (Jacoby, 1985). This way, workers’ wives, whom Ford also presumed to be the mothers of 
workers’ children, could attend to home and family duties. That these wages were also high enough for his workers to afford his product was 
no accident. Suffice it to say that it was beneficial for employers to set wage levels sufficiently high such that the income of a single family 
member— the man—could dovetail with a woman’s full commitment to ‘home production’ in meeting the needs of family life. In the US it 
also meant the provision of health and retirement benefits to fill in the gaps left by government programs—a practice later reinforced by 
public policy. This sort of solution was highly presumptive with respect to workers’ preferences regarding the household division of labor, 
but it implicitly guided employment relations practices for much of the industrial era. It had the negative effect, however, of underutilizing 
the human capital investments which society made in women’s education. Not surprisingly, women were systematically less likely to gain 
access to employer-sponsored education and training opportunities (Lynch, 1992). This was less of a problem for the overall economy, 
however, as long as women were willing to specialize in homework and view their paid labor-market activities as secondary to their husbands’. 
As the educational attainment of women increased and family structures became more varied, the demands to modify this ‘male 
breadwinner’ model of employment intensified. Thus there gradually developed the pressure to develop better work-life policies that allow 
women and men to fully utilize their human capital in the paid labor force. 
There are a number of reasons why labor-market forces cannot solve this problem on their own. Drago and Hyatt (2003) point out that a 
market failure occurs in the production of work family benefits similar to that of human capital investments. Left purely to the market, firms 
will not provide a sufficient level of benefits to facilitate work-life integration. An individual employer will generally opt not to offer on-site 
childcare, for example, because they (and those employees without children) would absorb its full costs. That is, prospective employees 
anticipating demand for the benefit would flock to the firm, but would probably leave the firm once they no longer needed the services of 
on-site childcare. Therefore, a program that may well provide a net social benefit would prove unprofitable to individual employers. Of course, 
if all employers offered or contributed equally to the provision of this benefit, prospective workers would spread themselves more or less 
evenly across the firms, and the problem would vanish. 
Aside from some sort of legal mandate, another way to deal with market failures is via coordination through collective bargaining that 
spreads common rules or patterns across competitors. This point, too, has been underdeveloped in most theoretical models and empirical 
studies of human capital. Collective bargaining facilitates work-life integration in a number of ways. To the extent which it boosts salaries and 
workers’ expectations of long-term financial security, it softens the opportunity cost attendant to one’s reallocation of time and energy from 
work to non-work activities. Union wage structures, characterized by the Tate for the job’ mantra, also standardize pay and benefits. In 
conjunction with rigid, transparent rules regarding staffing and promotions, this system for wage determination guards against the sort of 
Tat race’ that ensues in workplaces in which pay and promotions are determined solely by individual-level and often crude measures of 
performance, such as ‘billable hours’ (Landers et ah, 1996,1997). 
Alternatively, some unions such as the Harvard Union of Clerical and Technical Workers (HUCTW) negotiate explicitly for these benefits. 
In its contract with Harvard University, it prioritized the delivery of work and family benefits to its members, securing thirteen weeks of paid 
maternity leave (extremely generous by US standards) with flexibility to use additional time accrued through unused vacation and sick days. 
Other unions have negotiated with multiple employers to construct more far-reaching programs. For example, the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU) Local 1199 in New York City responded to its members’ demands for childcare benefit by negotiating with several 
employers for the creation of an omnibus program jointly funded and administered by labor and management. It now includes over 350 
employers, providing childcare centers, tuition vouchers, and even a summer camp for about 8,000 children every year.4 
Government’s role with respect to work-life integration is to ‘remove from competition’ those aspects of the employment relationship 
deemed valuable from a social standpoint that could fall victim to market forces. For example, one can argue that even if an individual 
employer does not benefit from encouraging working parents to take leave around the birth of a child, the long-term benefits to the child, 
the working parent, the present and future employers of the working parent, and the foregone long-term costs to the state ‘net out’ to a 
positive social benefit. Moreover, to the extent that effective work-life policies allow more continuous attachment to the labor force among 
women, prior public investments in their education and development should reap higher rates of return and potential skill shortages should 
be reduced. There is tremendous cross-country variation in the degree to which states have undertaken this responsibility by mandating or 
funding various forms of paid and unpaid leave for childbirth, child-rearing, elder care, and so on, with the US and Australia lagging behind 
other advanced industrialized nations with respect to these sorts of progressive policies. With some national exceptions, it is fair to say that 
even under the old social contract of the employment relationship, governments abdicated much of their policy-making responsibilities to 
employers, who themselves pushed the costs onto the families of their employees. Nonetheless, the employment relationship processed 
these issues in such a way that working people could afford to work a reasonable number of hours each week without abdicating non-work 
responsibilities and commitments. 
Technological Change 
In the industrial era, technology and technological change were largely viewed as capital substitution through automation, resulting in a 
debate over the net economic and social effects of technological change. To the extent that firms felt committed to their workers, the 
automation decision rested, in part, on the costs of redeploying labor to other parts of production still requiring labor input. In this way, 
decisions regarding new technologies, on the one hand, and training and retraining, discussed above, became inextricable. Furthermore, any 
particular manifestation of new technology could end up being harmful or beneficial to workers, depending upon how the innovation worked 
its way through the employment relations framework. That is, a particular machine was not in and of itself ‘upskilling’ or deskilling. 
Unions recognized, as one of their chief goals, the protection of workers from the adverse impact of technological changes, including the 
substitution of power- driven equipment for human strength or investments in machines that are faster and less prone to need repair. 
Contrary to what some may believe, outright opposition of unions to technological change was just one of many ways in which unions 
protected their members. In most cases, union leaders envisaged some path by which the rank and file could capture a share of the 
incremental gains resulting from the new technology. Frequently, union negotiators would elicit a job security pledge from employers in 
exchange for a promise that workers would be encouraged to embrace the new technology. This allowed managers the freedom, within this 
one constraint, to decide how labor should be redeployed as well as the nature and scope of programs for training and retraining the 
incumbent workforce. Unions also bargained for the creation of so-called Automation Funds’—the most well-known of which resulted from 
the mechanization of the meat-packing industry in the 1960s (Shultz and Weber, 1966). With seed money provided by Armour & Co., the 
fund, administered by a joint labor-management committee, undertook extensive examination of the adverse effects of ‘modernization, 
yielding a number of creative solutions to keep workers whole. Aside from training and a program of interplant transfers, the committee 
embarked on an aggressive placement program, going so far as to visit prospective employers and to make the case for hiring former meat-
packers. Programs like this one foreshadowed more extensive programs negotiated by the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the International 
Association of Machinists (IAM), among others, two decades later. 
The public sector has the toughest role of all with respect to workplace technological change. On the one hand, it must maintain a 
regulatory regime that encourages product market competition, in part, on the basis of technological and production innovations. On the 
other hand, it has to pick up where existing market and institutional forces leave off with respect to maintaining workforce readiness and 
dispersing costs associated with technological displacement. As noted above, the responsibility falls on the public sector to realign the system 
providing workers with general skills training—in this case, the foundational skills required to interact with the new technology or to meet 
the skill demands of other employers. There are a number of ways to socialize the costs of technological progress. For example, the use of 
experience rating with respect to unemployment/redundancy benefits places some of the displacement burden on those employers 
benefiting from new technologies, and some of the remaining share onto those taxpayers presumably benefiting as consumers from the new 
technology. Laws such as the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act in the US, or the Transfer of 
Undertakings/Protection of Employment (TUPE) Regulations in the UK, though meant to apply to a broader set of reasons for displacement, 
exemplify the type of regulations meant to mitigate technological displacement. They do so by providing workers with either severance pay 
or with time to begin the search for new employment. Finally, it is government’s responsibility to fashion and enforce the set of procedures 
by which workers can unionize, availing themselves of the benefits of collective bargaining in this area, described above. In sum, the 
institutions defining the employment relationship were able to ensure that steady technological progress came not at the expense of any 
one party, but instead benefited workers, employers, and society at large. 
Signs of Stress on Incumbent 
Employment Systems 
The social contract that held the industrial-era employment system together was far from perfect. Even at its best it was predicated, in large 
part, on employers’ ability to push a great many costs onto women. And it depended on employer behaviors that lasted only as long as labor 
was strong enough to demand them (Kochan et al., 1984; Jacoby, 1985). Customers also shouldered costs arising in the course of the three 
phenomena outlined above. In particular, a smaller number of producers with market power—a hallmark of the industrial era—could 
leverage product market power resulting from relatively inelastic demand for goods produced. Nonetheless, it is only through the social 
contract’s unraveling that we begin to understand the assumptions on which it was based, and there is ample evidence that this process is 
well under way. Consider the differences in the behavior of America’s largest employer before and after the unraveling. General Motors (GM) 
was America’s largest private-sector employer from the 1950s through the 1970s. Its 1950 contract with the UAW provided an ‘annual 
productivity factor’ of 2 percent (3 percent in later years) as a way of rewarding workers for productivity increases, over and above regular 
cost-of-living adjustments. The firm also introduced pensions, health insurance, and joint training funds, establishing a standard that its 
competitors had little choice but to meet. Thus, GM served as a force for incrementally ratcheting up employment conditions and living 
standards. Today, Wal-Mart serves as America’s largest, private-sector employer. Like GM in prior years, it provides shareholders with 
demonstrated growth and profitability, and its competitors likewise face pressure to follow the company’s employment model (Dube et ah, 
2007). However, the standard that Wal-Mart sets differs substantially from the standard established by GM in the 1950s. It pays wages that 
are 30 percent below the national average, and less than half its employees are covered by health insurance or retirement benefits. It has 
adamantly resisted unionization, and has found itself embroiled in suits over gender discrimination in pay and promotions, refusal to comply 
with statutory laws regarding overtime pay, and even well-documented cases of locking overnight cleaning crews into their stores 
(Lichtenstein, 2006). 
This contrast highlights some of the longer-term trends revealing cracks and now outright gaps in employment systems. The surge of blue-
collar layoffs beginning in the first half of the 1980s signaled that employers were willing to abdicate their historical duty to shield workers 
from market vicissitudes. A similar increase in layoff rates for white-collar workers came in the early 1990s, and hinted that ILMs may have 
begun to change for these workers as well. These layoffs had a source over and above intensified product market competition. Management’s 
middle layers, in particular, found that their roles in communication and coordination could be substituted for with ever-cheapening 
computing power. The diffusion of IT also contributed to the growth in non-traditional, explicitly short-term and ad hoc forms of employment. 
Without a long-term mindset, employers no longer view the formation and maintenance of human capital as their responsibility (Cappelli, 
1999), implying, as Berg (1970 [2003]) has argued, that Becker’s propositions regarding general training may have finally found some support 
in the data. The resulting training gap, aside from its obvious consequences for the economy, proves problematic for an additional reason. 
Employers actually set skill requirements and choose the technological tools that workers must learn to use. In other words, employers not 
only had the incentive to train—which now must be internalized some other way—but also had information on the composition of training 
demands, beneficial to the entire economy. 
The widening distribution of incomes offers the most obvious manifestation of the ensuing general skills gap (Autor et al., 2008). What is 
more, the adoption of new technologies, namely IT, in the workplace appears to be one of its chief causes, producing a phenomenon which 
economists label ‘skill-biased technological change’ (SBTC) (Acemoglu, 2002; Krueger, 1993). SBTC refers to the widening of the income 
distribution with respect to workers’ stock of general human capital, typically measured as years of education. According to this theory, 
increases in earnings inequality result from the introduction of new technologies—computers and other forms of IT—which then increase 
demand for the highly skilled workers who use them. Just as employers increase their demand for highly skilled workers, they find it easier 
to substitute the new, inexpensive technology for their low-skilled workers, further exacerbating earnings differentials with respect to skill. 
Therefore, it appears that at the very time employers are abdicating what had been their responsibility to provide general human capital, 
technological change has actually made some of this human capital increasingly indispensable to both firms and workers. 
Even this perverse consequence resulting from our outmoded, industrial era employment system could potentially be forestalled by the 
presence of trade unions. Depending on the particular circumstances, unions would probably accept, if not encourage, management’s 
embrace of IT. However, they would also work to negotiate employment security as well as programs for training, retraining, and the 
redeployment of low-skilled workers. This would enable the technology to deliver its intended increases in productivity while spreading the 
costs of technological adjustment. However, in the wake of the precipitous decline in trade union density across Anglo-Saxon economies, 
most workers cannot rely on collective bargaining in this way. The result has been a crisis of life-long learning—potentially crippling for an 
economy rooted in human capital. 
The absence of unions as a countervailing power is felt in yet another way. In the industrial era it was assumed that technological change 
would naturally result in capital substitution were it not for the strong tactics and demands of trade unions. In this way, collective bargaining 
dislodged notions of technological determinacy. When unions held sway over employers, firms had little choice but to undertake a ‘high-
road’ strategy with respect to technological change. If firms wanted to adopt new technology, they generally had to find a way to do it with 
their existing workforce. As noted above, this meant that new technology brought increased investments in human capital. However, it also 
meant that labor would receive a prenegotiated share of the gains resulting from the technology, leaving the remainder of the pie—however 
big or small—to the firm’s owners. Therefore, investments in technology actually drove managers to better manage all production inputs, 
including labor.5 This meant, among other things, reorganizing work to make optimal use of the technology, incentivizing workers, and often 
empowering them with increased shop-floor authority to use the technology as they saw fit. Those plants that followed this path, introducing 
new technologies alongside innovative employment practices, indeed performed better than plants which attempted to manage without 
workforce buy-in or work reorganization, revealing performance complementarities occasioned by simultaneous investments in both human 
and technological capital (MacDuffie, 1995). Moreover, those plants that took the ‘low road’ were generally forced to compete on price 
(Arthur, 1992). As previous chapters have shown, when firms can draw on less expensive labor from developing countries, this is much less 
likely to be a source of sustainable competitive advantage relative to competition rooted in product quality or some other form of product 
differentiation. 
It is with respect to work-life integration that the strains on legacy employment systems are perhaps most acute. After all, ‘family-friendly’ 
policies or other attempts at so-called ‘flexibility’ did not appear at GM until late in the 1990s, long after the firm’s reign as model employer 
had passed. The public sector has only recently taken action in Australia, and is yet to do so in the US. Nonetheless, the challenges of work-
life integration appeared relatively contained through the 1970s, due largely to the plurality of mothers and wives willing to specialize in 
home production. In the US, 70 percent of mothers in two-parent families now work in the paid labor force. Women with children in families 
near the median income have added, on average, 535 additional hours (about thirteen weeks) of paid work per year since 1979—an increase 
of nearly 56 percent! Men in this same category also saw increases, though much smaller in magnitude, netting out to an 18 percentage point 
jump in the number of annual hours worked per family. Given that three-quarters of the increases in family incomes come from the additional 
work hours of wives and mothers, it is safe to say that women have been used as an economic ‘safety valve’ over the last two decades (Mishel 
et al., 2007). Indeed, employers mitigate the effects of trading off time at home for time at work by introducing ‘family-friendly’ benefits. 
However, these benefits are disproportionately made available to managers and professionals (Kochan, 2005). Even for these white-collar 
employees, career concerns and workplace culture have discouraged their use (Baird and Litwin, 2005; Eaton, 2003). 
Revisiting Assumptions 
Contrasting GM and Wal-Mart has crystallized much of what has been detailed earlier in this volume on the distinctions between industrial 
economies and human capital or knowledge economies. Those chapters also detail the causes, not just the consequences, of the transition. 
What is clear for us, however, is that the basic assumptions underpinning the employment relationship require revision. 
Globalization—particularly the dissolution of borders with respect to the movement of capital, labor, and product—undermines the power 
of individual nations to regulate their labor markets in ways that encourage the right kinds of competition. Employers are correct when they 
argue that artificial floors on wages, benefits, and working conditions challenge their ability to compete in the product market. Thus, in one 
sense, former Wal-Mart CEO H. Lee Scott is right to dismiss our comparisons to the GM of an earlier era. 
Some well-meaning critics contend that Wal-Mart should be setting the pace for wages and benefits for the entire economy, just as a 
unionized General Motors was said to have done in the postwar period, helping usher in the great American middle class that this country 
is so proud of and rightfully so. The facts are that retailing doesn’t perform that same function in the economy as GM does or did. Retailing 
has never occupied the top tier of wages in this country, or in any country. (Greenhouse, 2005) 
It is also true that many employers, particularly in the service sector, now create opportunities for those other than the full-time, long-term, 
‘ideal worker’ envisioned in an earlier era, perhaps appealing to second and third earners—homemakers and students—in their households. 
This begins to compensate for the fact that full-time positions often pay too little to support a family. Finally, it is now the case that firms 
grow and shrink their employment rolls in response to market shocks—layoffs or redundancies. But they also do so in response to temporary 
and immediate demands for specific skills: human capital. Due in great part to IT, these human capital demands can often be more easily and 
more conveniently met not by establishing a conventional ‘in-house’ employment relationship, but by outsourcing—taking advantage of one 
of the new, harder-to-define forms of employment assumed away in the conventional picture of employment. And it is the various forms in 
which these ‘human capitalists’ present themselves—independent contractors, freelancers, or temporary/contingent workers—that most 
obviously breaks the mold formed by existing assumptions. If they are not employees, how can they bargain collectively? What rules govern 
their interactions with firms, guaranteeing the rights and benefits more easily delivered under the held-over model of employment? More 
specifically, how will the economy once again cultivate labor’s knowledge, skills, and abilities? How will it alleviate the stress, frustration, and 
insecurity attendant to emergent employment systems? And how can economies ensure that new technologies—particularly IT—allocate 
gains to a wide range of stakeholders? How managers and policy-makers respond to these sorts of questions determines the future of human 
capital, and begins with a thorough recasting of the assumptions underpinning the employment relationship. 
Recasting Work Arrangements for a Human Capital-Intensive Economy 
So, how can we encourage the right work arrangements for this post-industrial, human capital-based economy? The answer must begin by 
highlighting the assumptions that require change as economies move from a more national-based industrial economy dominated by male 
breadwinners, to a global knowledge-driven economy with a diverse workforce and varied family arrangements. However, we first consider 
the one assumption that fits employment systems old and new the centrality of trust. We use ‘trust’ here in its broadest sense to mean the 
ability of two or more parties to share strategic or valuable information with each other without fear that it will be used to undermine one’s 
interests. This type of trust is essential to sustaining productive interactions both within and across organizations. It is trust itself that has 
decayed and must be restored if organizations and national economies are to transition from industrial-era shareholder-dominated 
corporations to knowledge-based, human capital-centered companies capable of thriving under the new paradigm. Without trust, employers 
would have to abandon much of the human capital ‘value proposition’ articulated in previous chapters. For example, one way that human 
capital drives value is by pushing decision-making authority out to the front lines, empowering workers to use their own discretion to solve 
problems and to meet customer needs. This transforms the role of supervisor to one of coach and mentor, himself or herself guided by the 
idea that those closest to the work and to the customer are best positioned to make key decisions. It also requires that the organization and 
its managers respect and reward employees based on their contributions of human capital to the firm’s goals. In this volume, Chapters 11 
and 15 touch on the range of empirical substantiation for the performance effects of innovative employment practices that now abounds in 
the literature.6 The importance of trust also carries over into supplier relations. MacDuffie and Helper (2006) have demonstrated that an 
important part of Toyota’s competitive advantage over US auto companies lies in the trust which the company has built in supplier 
relationships—trust that allows for information-sharing and joint efforts to improve products and processes. The alternative—focusing solely 
on price reductions as one might with spot-market transactions—led to lower trust relationships, lower quality, and further loss of 
competitiveness in this industry. The implication is that trust continues to matter as a source of value, even when human capital is delivered 
by ‘suppliers’ rather than by employees per se. 
Organizations, alternatively, can forgo the implementation of innovative employment practices, instead maintaining a ‘command and 
control’ or ‘low road’ approach in which workers defer to their managers for instruction and withhold their knowledge, expertise, and ideas. 
While unions may no longer be able to pressure firms into taking the ‘high road’ business strategy—a deliberate choice on the part of 
managers and their organizations—will be a key determinant of whether or not the new economy generates more efficient and more 
equitable outcomes than is currently the case. Empirical research conducted in retail banks (Hunter et al, 2001; Autor et al, 2002; Hunter 
and Lafkas, 2003), call centers (Batt, 1999, 2002), and machine shops (Kelley 1990), among other settings, has shown that management 
shapes how similar or identical forms of IT are applied in production, either to boost workers’ skills, productivity, and earnings, or to reduce 
labor’s power and role in production. IT can play an important role in promoting a knowledge economy by making it relatively inexpensive to 
push previously centralized information to frontline workers (Brynjolfsson and Mendelson, 1993). This enacts aforementioned 
complementarities between human and technological capital—complementarities that obtain even where technology allows for highly 
standardized work if, for example, variation exists in customers’ expectations, needs, and potential value to the organization. Likewise, 
complementarities obtain where the technology generates output that requires human interpretation before this information can be 
communicated to the customer (Batt, 2002). Under these circumstances, attempts to deploy the technology without adopting the human 
capital elements of the new work system—usually some form of decentralized decision-making, team-based production, and incentive pay—
generate little or no performance benefit (Brynjolfsson et al., 2002; Bresnahan et al, 2000,2002). The lesson is that while unions are no longer 
able to pressure firms into taking the ‘high road’, firms ought to be encouraged by the prospect of complementarities to make this choice on 
their own. From either macroeconomic or organizational perspectives, it is clear that complementarities between human capital and IT rather 
than computers per se have been the real engine of economic growth (Black and Lynch, 2004; Bartel et al, 2007). 
All of these fruits of a human capital-centered economy turn, not surprisingly, on workers being well-trained and well-prepared for their 
new roles. It is therefore somewhat ironic (and unfortunate) that the old employment model was better poised to provide workers with 
human capital. As noted above, the onus fell largely on employers willing to invest in workers, based on mutual expectations of a long-term 
employment relationship. Given the decline in expected duration of employment as well as the increasing share of work done outside the 
boundaries of traditional employment, it is no longer a safe bet for workers to rely on their employers in this way. Thus, more of the 
investment burden now falls on individuals, extra firm labor-market institutions, and government. 
Trade unions, as noted above, have historically played an active role in training initiatives. Where they remain, many continue in this effort 
to keep their members’ ‘current’ and employable. The IAM—one of the more pioneering industrial unions on this issue—has worked with 
one its largest employers, the Boeing Corporation, to develop a number of training programs (Long and Barrett, 2004; Barrett et al, 2003). 
These are designed around structural and technological changes in the industry—namely, the shift from traditional materials to so-called 
‘composites’, and the firm’s goal to devote US production facilities to the high-value-added parts of the fabrication process. Without these 
training programs, managers would face a discrepancy between the skills they need and those of their incumbent workforce. Likewise, those 
low-seniority workers made redundant by competitive pressures would at least re-enter the labor market with cutting-edge, in-demand skills. 
Unfortunately, the training needs of those working under the less conventional and less permanent arrangements characterizing the new 
human capital economy are not accommodated by the traditional industrial union model. Indeed, it is this idea that motivates Chapter 12 
above, which details two of the ways that firms now go about acquiring human capital rather than developing it in-house. Of course, that still 
begs the question of who will invest in and develop this general human capital. These workers must take charge of monitoring and maintaining 
their own skill sets. However, inspiration for the new types of institutional support comes from two sources: craft unions and professional 
associations. This is not surprising. Both of these organizational forms, even in an industrial economy, serve the needs of those whose primary 
contribution to the economy is knowledge rather than physical strength or dexterity. Both serve workers who are likely to feel at least as 
much of a long-term commitment to their craft or their profession as they do to the actual organization for which they work. Craft unions 
and professional associations are also well-positioned to maintain and signal high standards and to leverage scale economies in the delivery 
of training. Perhaps even more critically, these organizations can provide advantage for their members by forecasting technological changes 
and innovations and anticipating the resulting and ever-changing skill requirements. 
Professional associations serving accountants, nurses, and civil engineers, and even lower-skilled occupations such as nurses’ assistants 
and home healthcare attendants, provide good models of ‘continuing education’ (Kochan, 2005).7 So do craft unions, with their well-
developed apprenticeship systems.8 Indeed, increasingly, craft unions are extending their reach to provide skills training to previously 
disenfranchised minorities to prepare them for ‘green-collar’ jobs in residential construction and building retrofitting (Pollin et al, 2008). This 
may be one way in which unions and professional associations redefine and reassert their role in the contemporary economy. An additional 
avenue by which professional associations could assert themselves is as ‘representatives’ of, or at least suppliers of, resources for those 
working under non-traditional employment arrangements. The most prominent and successful attempt to undertake this responsibility in 
the US is a New York City-based group founded as Working Today and now called Freelancers Union. Freelancers Union provides its members 
with much of what craft unions provide for their members—namely, different forms of health and welfare benefits. Unlike a standard craft 
union, the Freelancers Union serves those with a wide mix of skill sets. However, the group does provide, among other things, training around 
issues common to freelancing, such as self-promotion through new media, budgeting for a ‘business of one’, and legal and tax issues around 
freelancing. 
Finally, how can we ensure that the new economy addresses work-life integration better than it does at present, and more equitably than 
the institutions that appeared to address these issues in the industrial era? On the one hand, government can enact and fund paid forms of 
leave around childbirth and other major life events and responsibilities. However, even the most cooperative firms will find career-driven 
employees reluctant to take advantage of these benefits unless norms support their use. Thus, once again a collective action problem must 
be faced. This can only be done if employees collectively begin to voice their preferences and needs for flexibility to integrate their work and 
family responsibilities. While this need not and may not take the form of a traditional union, some functional equivalent of an employee voice 
mechanism may be required. 
Toward the Future 
The message from this reassessment is that significant institutional and policy reform will be needed in economies that want to grow, raise 
living standards, and achieve a more equitable distribution of income by making full use of all their human capital resources. We have focused 
on three challenges once addressed by the employment relationship that now require institutional and/or policy changes. The first is that 
paradoxically, just as human capital is becoming more critical to both individual firms and national economies, the decline in the expected 
duration of employment relationships and the weakening of union pressures reduces the willingness of individual firms to be a source of 
human capital investment. As Cappelli et al. note in Chapter 12, new external institutions—search firms and temporary help agencies— will 
need to play a bigger role in identifying and allocating talent. Professional associations and unions will need to expand their training, 
development, and placement roles. Government policy-makers will need to encourage formation of industry and/ or labor-market networks 
that pool investments in training. 
Second, the central role which women now play in the paid labor force implies the need to modify traditional assumptions about work 
and family life, norms, and expectations to support flexible work arrangements, and public policies to ensure that flexibility is widely available 
across the labor force. Failure to adapt to changes in work-family patterns risks systemic underutilization and low rates of return on womens 
human capital. 
Third, new technologies need to be implemented in ways that not only deal with worker concerns for potential or real displacement, but 
in conjunction with changes in work practices needed for these technologies to generate their highest returns. This requires a different 
mindset—one in which technology and human capital are seen as complements rather than as substitutes. 
All three of these changes in turn require new roles for government, employers, and labor organizations. Government will need to play a 
stronger role in coordinating private actions to overcome the market failures inherent in individual-firm- based human capital investment 
decisions. Labor unions, professional associations, and other groups that emerge to represent workers, will need to expand their roles as 
providers of education and training and as networks that link members to changing job opportunities. Finally, employers will need to become 
more engaged in the networks of firms, associations/unions, educational programs, search firms, and others that are becoming key sources 
of human capital development and allocation. In short, the key to achieving and benefiting from a human capital-led economy lies in 
developing modern extra-firm institutions in addition to innovative public policies. Indeed, this is needed to overcome classic market failures 
that arise from the competitive behavior of firms operating without institutional constraints. Thus, taken together, the changes in the 
economy, workforce, and workplace practices reviewed here illustrate that a complete theory of human capital and its role in the modern 
economy requires going beyond firm-centered theories to incorporate the full range of features that constitute an employment relations 
system. 
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Notes 
1. Chief among these in the US are healthcare, pensions, and paid time off—much less the province of the public sector than they are in other Anglo-
Saxon economies. 
2. Cappelli’s (2004) analysis of the corporate provision of general training shows firms to be concerned primarily with the deleterious effect of layoffs 
on the firm’s stock of social capital, and Nahapiet’s Ch. 2 above provides more detail on the intersection of human and social capital. 
3. Frequently labeled ‘work-family balance’, we prefer the phrase ‘work-life integration’. This underlines that workers have idiosyncratic preferences 
for how they allocate their time and energy between work and non-work activities (Rapoport et al., 2002). It also allows for workers’ non-familial 
but also non-working interests to figure into consideration, for example, community volunteering and civic responsibilities (Gomez and 
Gunderson, 2003). 
4. Kochan (2005) details these and other initiatives. 
5. This process, often referred to as the ‘union shock effect’, is usually attributed to Slichter (1941). However, Verma (2005) points out that Slichter 
never actually used this phrase. 
6. Boselie et al. (2005) catalogue much of the empirical work to date in this area, and pay special attention to the varied methodological and 
theoretical paths taken by researchers. 
7. Osterman et al. (2001) provide detailed examples of some of the government, institutional, and hybrid arrangements that have emerged in the 
US. 
8. It is also worth noting Autors (2001) finding that temporary help supply (THS) firms often fund workers’ computer training. While this service is 
welfare-enhancing and particularly valuable to its participants, the model does not readily extend to life-long learning. It is also predicated on 
workers’ self-selection as a signal of their latent ability, suggesting that it would break down entirely were it to be institutionalized as a method 
for workers to develop their human capital. 
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